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D/ICS-85-7636

JUL 8 1985

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Administration

FROM: Director, Intelligence Community Staff

SUBJECT: The Inman Advisory Panel Report on Overseas Security

REFERENCE: DDA 85-2184/1, dtd 27 June 85, Same Subject

1. The Advisory Panel report explores the security problems of U.S. missions abroad, primarily from the point of view protecting them from terrorist attack. Specific items of general interest or of specific concern to the DCI are cited below. ☐

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Interdepartmental Concerns (pp. 31-33)

Recommendations 39 through 45 deal with terrorist attack alerting mechanisms, formal rescission of erroneous alert messages, and sharing of terrorist threat information among U.S. agencies and with foreign liaison. These affect DCI interests, both directly and indirectly, and should be carefully considered. ☐

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Building Program (pp. 57-62)

The report recommends upgrading 134 posts to improve security, with primary emphasis on protection from terrorist attack. The threat of technical penetration by hostile intelligence services receives somewhat less emphasis. SECOM's experience with the Moscow new office building (NOB) dictates security involvement from inception when planning new buildings or modifications. The Moscow NOB experience should be thoroughly exploited for lessons learned and for further implementation of programs developed for that project. The report recommends placing security officers under Office of Foreign Buildings (OFB) management. The Moscow experience shows the objectives of the OFB and of security may not always be fully compatible. Rating of security officer performance solely by OFB officials could inhibit vigorous pursuit of security objectives. The report recommends extensive use of ADP in planning, oversight and management of security for overseas building projects. Such ADP projects should themselves be afforded a high level of security. ☐

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State Dept. review completed.

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Foreign Service Nationals

It is reported that the Department is currently planning to replace more than half of the 197 Soviet employees at Moscow Embassy with 70 cleared U.S. citizen employees over the next two years. The remaining Foreign Service Nationals (FSNs) will be prohibited from entering the new chancery building, which will house all sensitive activities. Similar programs are being undertaken in Eastern Europe, along with selective replacement of FSNs in the more sensitive positions. ☐

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Organization and Personnel (pp. 65-84)

The report recommends an increase in security personnel, organizational upgrading of the security function, enhanced training for professional security officers and those appointed to perform security duties at post, clarification of organizational responsibilities and consolidation of the security programs of State, AID, USIA and ACDA. These proposals should significantly strengthen the State Department's security program. ☐

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Security Inspections and Surveys (pp. 146-148)

The report cites the need for effective security inspections and surveys while pointing out a host of inspections now conducted by a variety of agencies, including AID, CIA, DIA and USIA and the problem of confusion and conflicting recommendations. It recommends reducing separate agency inspections and promoting joint inspections. The merger of State, AID, USIS and ACDA security functions should bring a drastic improvement in this situation. ☐

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Summary of Candidate Buildings for Replacement or Renovation (pp. 163-177)

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2. The report has little to say about security against technical penetration. On page 73, it recommends the Diplomatic Security Service include the present technical security programs, with "emphasis on a re-vitalized countermeasures program," [redacted] to assist the technical countermeasures program. Overall, the report's recommendations will, if followed, result in a substantially more effective security program for the Department of State. Personnel security was not dealt with extensively in the report. There are indications from other sources, however, that the department may be considering establishment of a polygraph program. If so, the initiative should be encouraged. [redacted]

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[redacted]
Vice Admiral, USN

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D/ICS-85-7636, 8 July 1985, The Inman Advisory Panel on Overseas Security

Prepared by: SECOM [] elb/8 July 1985

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